The Tort Crisis: Causes, Solutions, and
the Constitution
Wallace M Rudolph*
A majority of states, including Washington, have passed or
are considering tort reform legislation.' The push for tort
reform comes from a combination of economically organized
groups. Among these groups are manufacturers of products,
suppliers of services who wish to redefine occupiers' liability,
health care professionals who wish to limit malpractice claims,
and local government officials who wish to limit their liability
for operating governmental entities.2 These groups are arrayed
against the organized bar whose interests parallel those of the
public at large.'
Tort reform legislation seeks to limit recovery for pain and
suffering, 4 to cap attorneys' fees,' to adopt proportional liabil* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. Although this analysis is my own,
it draws heavily from R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF

EMINENT DOMAIN (1985), and from discussions with my colleague Tom Holdych
concerning warranties and strict liability.
1. Wall St. J. Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col.6; source: Alliance of American Insurers and
the Wall Street Journal interviews. According to the article, 27 states have acted or
proposed to limit liability. See Appendix for a brief review of the various proposals to
limit liability.
2. See generally supra note 1.
3. Outside of insurance companies themselves, the main supporters of tort reform
are the medical profession, small businesses that may be held liable under the business
invitee rules, and governmental entities that either deliver services below cost or
deliver "free" services. These groups can, on a local level, deliver substantial political
support.
The bar represents the public because the bar is the only organized group whose
interests parallel those of persons who will be injured in the future. Plaintiffs injured
by the activities of the groups listed above cannot be organized politically because they
are unknown until they are injured. Before the injury, they are part of consumer
groups that, as we will point out, may be forced to pay higher prices for medical care,
products, services, and taxes if high tort recovery is permitted to continue. The only
organized economic group that has a direct economic interest in large recoveries are
trial lawyers working on a contingent fee. From the lawyers' perspective, their interest
in higher fees is consistent with the interests of the unknown future victims of medical
malpractice, product malfunctions, injuries on business premises, and injuries resulting
from not-for-profit government activities.
4. See, e.g.. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1987).
5. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146
(1988).
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ity instead of joint and several liability,6 to adopt statutes of
repose,7 and to eliminate the collateral source rule in cases of
medical malpractice.' The effect of these changes would be to
reduce substantially injured parties' recovery. 9
At present, damages awarded for non-negligent actions
have resulted in a tort system that is out of control.10 The
6. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 18.440-.460 (1988).
7. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.11 (1981).
8. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565
(1982); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34 (1985).
According to the collateral source rule, benefits received by the plaintiff from
sources wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer, which have a
tendency to mitigate the consequences of the injury, may not be considered
when assessing the damages the wrongdoer must pay. . . . The rule is
designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from collateral payments
made to the person he has injured.
Bowman v. Whitelock, 43 Wash. App. 353, 357, 717 P.2d 303, 306 (1986) (citations
omitted).
9. Capped recoveries by definition limit the amount a plaintiff would receive if the
law did not impose a cap. Statutes of repose would prevent some plaintiffs from
recovering anything for their injuries. Additionally, final notice requirements would
prevent plaintiffs from recovering if they failed to fulfill procedural requirements.
The elimination of strict liability for products sold in interstate commerce would
eliminate from recovery those plaintiffs who could not prove that the manufacturer
was negligent in the design or manufacture of its product. The elimination of joint and
several liability and a replacement of proportionate liability where the plaintiff is
partially negligent would eliminate the plaintiff's ability to recover all of his losses
from a defendant that had sufficient resources. In many cases, some of the defendants
might be judgment proof while others had substantial assets. See Wall St. J., Feb. 3,
1986, at 5, col. 1.
The restriction on attorneys' fees, although ostensibly for the benefit of the
injured, would actually lower the total recovery for plaintiffs as a class. Large
attorneys' fees allow attorneys to spend more resources both in investigation and in
legal analysis to support plaintiffs' claims. A restriction on fees would limit the kinds
of cases that lawyers bring to cases in which liability is clear and would eliminate the
more imaginative cases that are expensive and difficult to prove. The elimination of
the collateral source rule would allow defendants to take advantage of insurance
benefits paid for by the plaintiff's employer, the plaintiff, or the public at large and
thereby reduce the liability of the defendant for his tortious acts.
10. Whether real or imagined, the crisis is accepted as fact by the popular press.
See Zuckerman, Tort Reform, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 7, 1987, at 68
[hereinafter Zuckerman].
One may claim that it is excessive verdicts rather than the extension of liability
that has lead to the tort crisis. Studies have shown that it is the lesser injuries that are
overpaid rather than the more serious injuries. Further, if excessive jury verdicts
were at issue, the crisis would extend to the automotive field as well. Very little of the
clamour for tort reform appears to relate to rising auto-insurance rates. See, e.g.,
Regan Asks for Limits on Lawsuits, Tacoma News Tribune, May 31, 1986, at A3, col. 1;
Satter, The Damage-Award Lottery, San Francisco Chron., May 25. 1986, (This World)
at 20, col. 2; Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, March 24, 1986, at 16;
Lacayo, The Malpractice Blues, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60; Torts Control, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 4, 1986, at 30, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at 1, col. 1
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chaos has led to increased insurance rates that have in some
cases eliminated socially useful businesses. A notorious example is the withdrawal from the market of intra-uterine
devices." In addition, many local governments have eliminated fireworks displays and have terminated other public
recreations and amusements. 12 Obstetricians and gynecologists
have increasingly switched fields or ceased practicing medicine.
Also, many businesses have closed because of higher insurance
rates. 3 Whether the existing tort system has systematically
eliminated such useful economic activity or whether the rise in
insurance rates is marginally insignificant is not clear from the
existing data.' 4 Nevertheless, the political perception of harm
does exist and has resulted in tort reform in Washington and
in other states. 5 The ostensible purpose of tort reform is to
lower insurance rates while at the same time preserving the
extensions of liability adopted by the courts since the 1960s.
The preamble to the 1981 Washington Tort Reform Act articulates this purpose. 1
(announcement that eight attorney's general have brought an antitrust suit claining
Lloyds of London and various major insurance companies have conspired to reduce
liability coverage and raise rates).
11. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987) [hereinafter Insurance Crisis].
12. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1986, S. 23, at 1, col. 4; Wall St. J., June 6, 1986, at 27, col.
1.
13. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1986, § XI, at 1, col. 3; id., Nov. 18, 1985, § I at 1, col. 2; id.,
Sept. 29, 1985, § 1 at 56, col. 1.
14. N. WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 4-7 (1987).
15. Zuckerman, supra note 10, at 68; M. BIRD & B. TROLLIN, SELECTED STATE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION:

AFFORDABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE

(1986); Compensation and Liability For Productand Process Injuries, A.L.I. PROGRESS
REPORT, Apr. 13, 1987; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP OF THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT

CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986). See also supra note 1.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010 (preamble) (1987) in pertinent part states:
Tort reform in this state has for the most part been accomplished in the
courts on a case-by-case basis. While this process has resulted in significant
progress and the harshness of many common law doctrines has to some extent
been ameliorated by decisional law, the legislature has from time to time felt
it necessary to intervene to bring about needed reforms such as those
contained in the 1973 comparative negligence act.
The purpose of this amendatory act is to enact further reforms in the tort
law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among
parties at fault.
Of particular concern is the area of tort law known as product liability
law. Sharply rising premiums for product liability insurance have increased
the cost of consumer and industrial goods. These increases in premiums have
resulted in disincentives to industrial innovation and the development of new
products. High product liability premiums may encourage product sellers and
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The questions for the public are whether caps on liability
and statutes of repose deal with the actual cause of the
increased rates, and whether such caps on damages and statutes of repose unfairly impose costs on tort victims in violation
of their constitutional rights and standards of fairness. Our
thesis is that the expansion of tort liability based on strict liability or enterprise liability without regard to the proper measurement of damages in such cases is at the root of the
insurance crisis rather than the awarding of excessive damages
in ordinary fault cases. Stated another way, the expansion of
tort liability was based upon the appropriateness of internalizing the cost of economic activity by spreading the risk among
the beneficiaries of such activity, but the damages were measured under full compensation theories rather than a more
appropriate insurance approach. This divergence between basing liability upon insurance principles and measuring damages
upon fault principles has resulted in the failure of businesses
to incorporate the legal charges against them within the price
of their product. 7 Our solution is to match appropriately damages to liability while protecting the constitutional right of
individuals to life, liberty, and property. This solution necessarily includes the right of an individual to be free from intentional or careless injury to his or her bodily integrity.
I.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE TORT CRISIS

A.

Basic Tort Concepts

The law recognizes three kinds of torts, each requiring a
manufacturers to go without liability insurance or pass the high cost of
insurance on to the consuming public in general.
It is the intent of the legislature to treat the consuming public, the
product seller, the product manufacturer, and the product liability insurer in
a balanced fashion in order to deal with these problems.
It is the intent of the legislature that the right of the consumer to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of an unsafe product not be unduly impaired.
It is further the intent of the legislature that retail businesses located
primarily in the State of Washington be protected from the substantially
increasing product liability insurance costs and unwarranted exposure to
product liability litigation.
17. Under the fault system a business might not be able to include full tort
recovery from negligence in the price because its competitors that use cost justified
care would not incur such expenses and could undercut the negligent manufacturer's
price. On the other hand, no manufacturer could avoid paying damages for losses
arising from unavoidable accidents and such damages would be included in the price of
the product.
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different damage rule. The three kinds of torts are intentional,
negligent, and strict liability.
The law of intentional torts defines rights and prevents
infringement of life, liberty, and property.' 8 Clearly anyone
who intentionally invades the known interest of another
should pay the consequences. Thus, in intentional torts, all
damages flowing from the tort, not merely those proximately
caused by the tort, are recoverable.' 9 Damages include loss of
dignity as well as general damages.20 The reason for a liberal
damage rule is that the law of intentional torts, like the criminal law, seeks to deter particular acts. Hence, when losses
arise from intentional torts, we always decide that the loss
2
should be borne by the tortfeasor rather than by the victim.
Unlike intentional torts, negligence involves the careless
doing of lawful acts. We have no interest in deterring the basic
act itself but only in deterring the careless performance of that
act. For example, we do not wish to prevent individuals from
moving vehicles from one place to another, but we do wish to
deter carelessness in the moving of vehicles. Carelessness is
always a relative act. Driving 200 miles per hour on the salt
flats of Utah to test the durability of an automobile is not careless, whereas driving 45 miles per hour on a busy Manhattan
street is careless. Thus, whether an act is negligent depends
upon the circumstances under which the act is performed.
According to Judge Learned Hand's generally accepted
test for optimal social efficiency, when an act is negligent, the
probability that injury will result must be balanced against the
cost of avoiding that injury.2 2 The formula requires that the
18. The basis of intentional tort is a direct interference with the life, liberty, or
property of another. Trespasses are actionable even when punitive damages are
unavailable because mere interference with such rights clearly limits them.
19. In addition, one may obtain injunctions, punitive damages when allowed, and
damages for insult to dignitary interest. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 7.3 (1973).
20. Id. at § 12.
21. The intentional invasion of another's legal rights shows a disregard not only
for the rights of the individual whose rights one has invaded but society's distribution
of legal rights. The imposition of liability is a minimum we can expect to support the
legal system.
22. Judge Learned Hand summarized and applied these principles in two
important decisions, Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492,
and United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break away from her
moorings, and, since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her,
the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she will break
away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
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actor make a prior judgment. Logically, the actor can predict
only those risks of loss that would be generally foreseeable.
Obviously, the actor cannot take precautions against unknown
losses or losses that can be known only at the time of the
action. Because the purpose of the law of negligence is to deter
careless activity, the rules of negligence allow injured parties
to be compensated for losses resulting from careless acts by
others. To the extent that a direct relationship exists between
the careless activity and the interest invaded, the law requires
that the tortfeasor, rather than the victim, bear the loss.2"
Under Judge Hand's formula, a manufacturer is not negligent unless he or she fails to take a cost-justified precaution.
For example, use of the sample method of inspection is not
negligent if the cost of inspecting a product sample would give
a 95% assurance of eliminating defective merchandise and the
risk of loss for the sale of defective products was less than the
cost of inspecting 100% of the products produced. Using the
sample method would also lower the cost of producing the
product and under competitive conditions would result in a
lower overall market price for that product. Thus, as a group,
consumers of the product would benefit from the manufacturer's failure to take unjustified precautions.
Nevertheless, someone will be injured by a defective product not spotted by the sample method of inspection. One could
readily argue that a user of a product should not bear a loss
adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state
it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the
burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e.,
whether B < PL.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. See generally, Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 28 (1972); Note, Origin of the Modern Standard of Due Care in Negligence, 176 WASH. U.L.Q. 447 (1976); Terry, Negligence, 20 HARv. L. REv. 40, 42 (1915);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291-93 (1965).
Some commentators have been critical of Hand's risk-benefit method for rendering safety decisions and resolving accident disputes, with its emphasis on economic efficiency and its implicit denial of "soft" or "human" variables and individual rights. See,
e.g., Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidere" The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 617 (1980); Hubbard, Reasonable HUMAN Expectations: A Normative
Model for Imposing Strict Liabilityfor Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465,
468-69 (1978).
In certain contexts, courts sometimes do appear to protect "rights" over efficiency,
as, for example, by entitling an actor to rely upon the expectation that others will act
with reasonable care and otherwise obey the law. Cf. Hallett v. Stone, 216 Kan. 568,
534 P.2d 232 (1975) (driver forced to brake abruptly had no duty to look to rear but
could rely instead on duty of driver in following car to proceed with care).
23. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 169 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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caused by a manufacturer's failure to take an unjustified precaution merely to lower the price for the majority of users.
The failure to impose liability on the manufacturer would
result in the unlucky purchaser subsidizing the other purchasers of the product.2 4 On the other hand, testing 100% of the
product could price the product out of the market.
The theory of strict liability evolved to redress the harm
caused by a manufacturer's non-negligent failure to inspect
100% of the products produced. Strict liability in tort, as established by Dean Prosser2 5 and Justice Traynor, 6 derived from
Judge Hand's formula, as well as from warranty law. For
example, under an implied warranty of fitness, it was not necessary to determine whether an injury resulted from failure to
take justified or unjustified precautions. The warranty itself
was sufficient to secure for a purchaser the benefit of his
bargain.
Strict liability is also called enterprise liability. The enterprise essentially internalizes unavoidable losses by including
those losses in the cost of its product. Fault is irrelevant.'
24. One might argue that the unlucky customer had exchanged the lower price for
the lack of coverage and that he could use the money saved to buy accident insurance.
First, the purchase of such insurance would have a substantial transaction cost so as to
be uneconomical in most cases; second, the pool being insured would, in most cases,
not be as coherent a group regarding the particular risks as the actual group of
purchasers.
25. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1131 (1960).
26. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363 (1965). See also Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A Critical
Histor of the Intellectual Foundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 459
(1985) [hereinafter Priest].
27. This statement of strict liability does not, of course, include strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities. In those activities, the injured party is a stranger to the
enterprise, his losses are similar to those of an injured party in a negligence action, and
he should recover all of his damages.
Nuisance cases, inverse condemnation actions, and actions arising out of
ultrahazardous activities, although involving strict liability concepts, are not adaptable
to the insurance-pool solution proposed infra. These cases all involve "takings" of the
adjoining property, and the full value of the taking must be paid. The analogy in these
cases is to the intentional tort of trespass rather than to the concepts of product
liability, common carriers, and industrial accidents. The difference between liability in
ultrahazardous activities and negligence is that the person who is in control imposes a
non-reciprocal risk on others.
Under the law of warranty, a purchaser may recover for a defective product;
however, consequential damages may be limited by contract. The issue is whether the
consequential damages, apart from personal injury, should be limited to those damages
that are generally applicable to the group as a whole. The text argues that the effect
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Internalizing the costs of an enterprise is the antithesis of negligence, the social purpose of which is to ensure that the actor
pays all avoidable costs and that unavoidable costs be
shouldered by the person who is injured by chance.2"
R

Internalizationof Losses by Groups Supporting

Tort Reform
The push for tort reform is motivated by a need for
greater availability of insurance at affordable rates. The
groups supporting tort reform can avoid liability for intentional or negligent tortious conduct by modifying their behavior or adopting necessary safeguards. But liability for
unavoidable losses-strict liability--can be minimized only
through insurance. It is thought that by limiting the amount
that juries may award, insurance payouts will decrease; as a
result, rates will drop and coverage will become more available. This solution, however, is constitutionally defective, as
we shall show in Part II. A better solution for insuring against
unavoidable losses that can be employed by each group supporting tort reform consists of internalizing those losses.
In product liability cases, for example, the loss is internalized to the extent that it is borne by customers or users of the
product. Any increase in unavoidable costs results either in
higher prices or in the non-availability of the goods or services.
Allocation of funds to compensate injured parties for unavoidable losses must, therefore, be fairly distributed over the group
of awarding damages arising from no-fault liability is comparable to a group of
customers buying a product together with an insurance policy to cover no-fault risks.
Although strict liability from the sale of products derived its name from cases
involving ultrahazardous activities, see, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737
(1865), the basis of product liability is quite different from liability arising from
ultrahazardous activity. In product liability, as we have shown, the whole class of
users benefits when the enterprise does not take non-cost-justified safety precautions.
On the other hand, individual parties injured by ultrahazardous activities should be
fully compensated in the same manner as plaintiffs in nuisance or inverse
condemnation cases. In ultrahazardous activity cases, as in nuisance and inverse
condemnation cases, the party causing the damage is essentially asking others to bear a
non-reciprocal risk.
It is obvious that the damages to an adjoining landowner from ultrahazardous
activity should not be treated under an insurance principle. Because an adjoining
landowner receives no direct benefit from the activity, all of his damages should be
included within the cost of the ultrahazardous activity. The basis of liability in such
cases is private necessity. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transport. Co., 109 Minn. 456,
124 N.W. 221 (1910).
28. Priest, supra note 26, at 501-11.
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of product users.29 Under these circumstances, the users of the
product are like an insurance pool. Logically, members of the
pool would prefer to exclude anyone who is particularly susceptible to damage or who could be damaged to a degree not
characteristic of the average person in the pool. The problem
of special susceptibility is generally handled by a warning or by
the exclusion of persons who misuse the product.' The problem of uncharacteristic damages such as the loss of high
income, however, is not covered, since atypical customers do
not pay more for their goods or services. As a result, the law
protects high income people from loss more than it does low
income people who are injured by the same non-negligent act.
This reverse socialism is inconsistent with the manner in
which the law treats other strict liability or warranty claims in
property.3 '
In warranty or common carrier liability other than personal injury, liability is limited except where an additional
charge is made according to value.3 2 No reason exists for failing
to apply this formula to personal injury cases, since it is easier
and more efficient to require that the user buy insurance for
his special characteristics than to impose the obligation for
those characteristics upon other members of the group. This
position is consistent with the reasoning that extended product
liability to users and purchasers of goods who were injured
without fault. As we have pointed out, to expect a particular
injured consumer to bear the risk of an unavoidable injury so
that other consumers may purchase the product at a more reasonable price is clearly arbitrary. Similarly, it is equally unfair
for the majority of consumers to bear the costs of a loss for
29. One might argue that the partial costs of strict liability are borne by the
stockholders because the higher price will result in lower sales. This would certainly
be true if full negligence damages are continued. However, if an amount equal to the
cost of insurance for unavoidable risks is added to the price, the insurance cost will be
borne by the consumers, assuming a competitive industry.
Insurance costs are no different than any other manufacturing costs and must be
included in the price of the product, since all producers will have similar costs.
Stockholders will be effected only during a transition period if excess capacity exists
because demand was artificially enhanced by externalizing such costs. If strict liability
is perceived as a cost of the product, all users of the product must be fairly charged.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment j (1965).
31. Under warranty law the warrantor is liable for consequential damages only if
foreseeable. The foreseeability element allows the seller to either charge more in
special circumstances or enter into an effective disclaimer. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
32. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982) (provides for a limit of liability to the amount
declared on the shipping documents).
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which they would not receive an equal benefit, that is, equal
damages, if they were injured.33
The solution to this problem under warranty law, the paradigm for strict liability, is to reduce or eliminate the buyer's
obligation to pay for a defective product and to permit the
seller to limit consequential damages to a liquidated amount.
By contrast, section 402A of the Restatement of Torts prohibits
any limitation on consequential damages for personal injury
when liability is imposed for defective products.3 4 Section
402A states that in a no-fault situation the group must subsidize an individual plaintiff.35 The solution in tort law is to
limit damages to those reasonably anticipated among the gens
erality of the product's users.3
The price of a product, then, should include both an
implied warranty of merchantability and a personal injury pol33. A requirement that full tort damages be paid under strict liability violates the
insurance principle of equal premiums for equal risk. In product liability cases, all
members of the class covered pay the same price for the product and therefore the
same price for the coverage allowed by strict liability. Tort damages under the fault
system require the tortfeasor to take the plaintiff as he finds him. Thus, negligent
defendants must pay for damages resulting from the special characteristics of the
plaintiff, Vosberg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891); and for payment for lost
income, even though one person's income may be eight to ten times as great as
payment for pain and suffering, assuming such payment is subject to actuarial
evaluation. Because of these variations, it is difficult, if not impossible, for producers
to purchase actuarially sound insurance for the risks involved, and the premiums
required to purchase such insurance must include an additional amount to cover the
uncertainty of the risks. The additional premium to pay for uncertainty and to pay
damages for the more susceptible members of the class of customers may price the
product out of the reach of many of its customers or require that the product be
withdrawn from the market altogether.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
35. Id.
36. See Insurance Crisis, supra note 11, at 1542. As we have previously pointed
out, each purchaser is a member of a class that benefits if the manufacturer does not
employ non-cost-justified safeguards. On the other hand, there is no reason that one
party should bear the full loss of the risks in using a product. The solution, therefore,
is to pay the losses of the particular injured person, but only to the extent that such
losses would have equally effected the other purchasers if by chance they were
injured. A non-subsidized solution would require that there be a direct relationship
between the increased price of the product to each individual commensurate with the
risk of including that individual in the pool. Strict liability should cover each customer
equally when each customer pays the same price for the product. Any coverage over
and above that unmeasurably applicable to the members of the pool should be
purchased in the market by the members of the pool. See infra note 37. This concept
would require some statistical evidence on the income distribution of purchasers of
particular products. If this concept were adopted by statute, one could provide general
schedules for classes of products like automobiles, lawnmowers, and the like. Obvious
luxury products would have higher lost income schedules than mass-market products.
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icy to cover medical bills and the loss of income of an ordinary
user of the product. The insurance policy should not include
damages for non-economic losses, such as pain and suffering or
disfigurement.3 7 Under such a system, the manufacturer could
treat the risk of loss as an internal expense, while consumers
3
would benefit by being covered for unavoidable losses.
One might argue, however, that if we did not impose full
tort recovery under a strict liability system, it might be more
reasonable to have society as a whole, or individuals themselves, carry first-party insurance to cover actual losses. Such
a system, however, would not impose the appropriate losses on
the group benefitting from the services nor could the system
deal with the problems of collateral benefits that arise when
insurance is purchased by an individual rather than by society
as a whole.3 9 By specializing losses, activities that have a
higher risk would not be subsidized by lower-risk activities and
costs would be imposed only on persons who actually benefit
37. Non-economic damages should not be included for two reasons. First, the
variations in the group would be emphasized by allowing some person to obtain more
coverage than others while paying the same price for the product; and second, this
coverage does not currently exist in the insurance industry and it is very difficult to
price. The second reason results from the first as well as the difficulties of accurately
measuring such losses. Presently, one cannot purchase accident insurance to cover
pain and suffering or emotional losses. The problems of a family evaluating these
amounts after an accident relative to the generality of the group prevents such policies
from coming into existence because of adverse selection. Purchasers need only ask
whether they would buy insurance in a pool where the cost of the premium would
cover such claims. The purchaser would fear that the cost of his coverage would be so
indefinite that he could not risk belonging to the group. See also Insurance Crisis,
supra note 11, at 1547.
38. As we have pointed out, the pool of persons in a comparative market who
benefit from the manufacturer's decision not to take a non-cost-justified precaution
consists of the manufacturer% customers because they can purchase the product at a
lower price. Price in a competitive market is based on cost including a reasonable
return on capital (profit). When the manufacturer does not take the unjustified
precaution, every customer is potentially at risk and every customer receives the
benefit of the lower price. Strict liability is therefore analogous to requiring the
producer to sell the product tied to an accident policy to protect the unlucky customer
who will be injured by the defect. Since the tie-in of the accident policy cannot be
price adjusted for the property loss of particular customers, a uniform recovery is
required to prevent certain customers from obtaining more protection from their
purchase price than others.
39. As the text points out, requiring the injured individual to bear the full cost of
unavoidable defects would fail to charge the industry with the full cost of producing
the product in question. A rule of no liability or a rule of full liability would not allow
the industry the benefit of any insurance recovery by the individual. If a product is to
bear the full cost properly attributable to its sale and production, a rule similar to that
suggested must be adopted.
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from the risk.40
Occupiers' liability is similar to product liability in that
occupiers supply services to a group of consumers. Although
the language of negligence has never been officially abandoned, the duty to provide a safe environment in stores and
places of amusement is closer to the liability of common carriers than to Hand's negligence standard. Thus, the occupier is
generally held liable for a defect without regard to whether
the costs of protecting the injured party exceeded the amount
of foreseeable injury.4 The cases that clearly demonstrate this
approach are those that impose liability for failure to patrol
the premises sufficiently to prevent injury by illegal actions of
third parties. 42
Imposing some liability on occupiers for losses arising on
their premises is certainly not improper. Users of the premises

benefit from the service in the same way that customers or
users of manufactured products benefit from the use of goods.
Including a fixed insurance policy as a tie-in to the sale of
products or the use of facilities fairly distributes the costs of
unavoidable risks among the persons benefitted. By the same
token, users should not subsidize the damages incurred by persons with special talents or peculiar susceptibilities when there
is no question of fault.43
Like occupiers, medical practitioners provide services to a
group of consumers. Initially, strict liability concepts may
seem inapplicable to medical practitioners. By definition, malpractice requires some negligence to permit recovery. In medical malpractice, the tasks involved are so complex that it is
often difficult to determine that a part of the task did not meet
professional standards. Thus the line between medical judgment and negligence is not one that lay persons can easily
40. The suggested system of internalizing costs assures that industries will bear

their own costs. Assigning the loss to the individual or to society as a whole through
welfare or general health insurance would lead to a subsidy of inherently risky
activities. This system would throw together persons who purchased products such as
hang gliders with persons purchasing ordinary furniture. A general insurance
payment would require the risk adverse person to pay the losses of persons who
enjoyed risk.
41. PRossER AND KEETON, supra note 23, at 427-28; Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash. 2d 866,
529 P.2d 1054 (1975). Note that the duty to protect invitees exists whether or not the
cost of preventing the injury exceeds the possible losses from such injury.
42. Gifford v. Stockett, No. J-85-0769 (B) (S.D. Mass., filed Nov. 12, 1987: reported
in 31 ATLA 82 (1988)); Rehfeld v. III Properties, No. 47639 (Minn., filed Nov. 4, 1987;
reported in 31 ATLA 83 (1988)).
43. See supra note 33.
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pinpoint in ordinary litigation, and juries tend to err on the

side of finding negligence. On the other hand, permitting this
judgment to be made by medical boards, as proposed in some
legislation, would leave the victim at the mercy of the profession's self-interests. Using the former approach has led to
something like strict liability, whereas the use of medical
boards would lead to a denial of access to the courts by injured
plaintiffs.
The solution lies in dealing with this matter in the same
manner that we suggested for product liability. In some ways,
the insurance concepts discussed above are more applicable to
the delivery of medical services than to the delivery of products because the insurance can be tailored to the individual
case. The relationship of health care provider to patient is similar to that of customer and manufacturer with one exception:
no privity of contract exists between the manufacturer and his
customers, and the large number of customers prevents tailoring of individual contracts. Privity of contract does exist, however, between the health care provider and his patient. The
relationship can, therefore, be tailored to the needs of the parties.44 Unfortunately, the medical profession has limited the
use of individual-practitioner contracts. The prevailing standards prevent the professional from warranting his work or
45
guaranteeing against bad results.

When supplying medical services, the health care provider
is liable under the doctrine of informed consent if he fails to
inform the patient of risks inherent in a particular treatment.
If the injury or disability described does in fact result from the
treatment, the patient cannot claim negligence, since by definition the risk was inherent in the treatment and could occur
44. One might argue that the patient could equally insure against the risk.
However, the doctor is clearly more knowledgeable concerning the risk and the
necessary consequences of a bad result. Further, if the doctor covers the risk there is
no problem of dealing with the collateral benefits rule. Of course, the patient is free to
buy additional coverage for losses not included within doctors' coverage, such as loss of
special skills.
45. See. e.g., Gault v. Sideman 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963) (contract to
cure unenforceable). It is clear that specific contracts will be enforced but both the
profession and the country consider them unethical. See Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
260 N.Y. App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d. 92 (1940); Annotation, Recovery Against Physician
on Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve ParticularResult or Cure, 43 A.L.l 3d 1221
(1972); see also American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics, reprinted
in. 164 J. A.M.A. at 1484 (July 1957).
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even though the services met the highest professional
standard.
Because professional standards prevent the practitioner
from warranting his work, the risk of a bad result is imposed
upon the patient. Thus, when a bad result occurs, the patient
has a substantial interest in suing. His claim will either be that
the health care provider failed to give information necessary
for informed consent or that the provider's services fell below
professional standards.
On the other hand, if the health care provider could warrant or insure against the risks inherent in a particular treatment and include the cost of insurance for additional medical
care in the price of his service, many malpractice suits might
be avoided. Coverage could be limited to subsequent medical
care and disability payments and could exclude pain and suffering as well as other non-economic losses. Moreover, if the
health care provider insured against the risk, the collateral
source rule need not be invoked. 46 Finally, if the risk of a bad
result were included in the fee, actual payment would normally come from pre-tax dollars as a health insurance fringe
benefit.4 7 Such a system would not prevent appropriate malpractice suits. However, those suits could be limited by
allowing the health care provider to make an offer of judgment
for payment of non-economic costs. A refusal to accept the
payment could then be used to impose costs on the patient if
the jury refused to award more than the amount offered by the
health care provider.
Another major group supporting tort reform consists of
municipal and county officials who have recently been held liable for injuries arising from the delivery of governmental services.48 In these cases, the users are the public at large, and the
46. See supra note 8; see also supra note 36. If the loss is covered by the medical

practitioner's own insurance policy rather than by the patient's health insurance, there
is no question of collateral benefits. This would be true even when the patient's health
insurance had paid for the direct fee of the medical practitioner which in turn paid for
such insurance coverage.
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (provisions allowing health insurance as a non-taxed
fringe benefit).
48. The withdrawal of government services has been real. See supra notes 11 &

12. Free or non-charged government services, such as parks and athletic facilities,
cannot be expected to cover losses arising from non-negligent risks because no fee is
charged. Such risks must be borne either by the taxpayer or the individual user. One

could argue against non-negligent liability in such cases because there is no pool to
bear the cost through higher user fees. Design defects in highways, however, should be
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injured parties are members of the public. Obviously, considerations of fairness would induce juries to grant some sort of
recovery to a party injured by a defect in the delivery of public
goods. Accordingly, there is good reason to prevent especially
large recoveries for persons who suffer extensive losses
because of their peculiar characteristics.
The only reason for limiting liability for the negligence of
public officials is because the public is not engaged in profitmaking operations and thus should not be held responsible.
This argument does not bear close scrutiny in cases of ordinary
negligence but should be sufficient to immunize the public
from punitive damages.
A more difficult problem is the imposition of strict liability
on public bodies even on the limited bases proposed above in
the discussion of occupiers' liability. Public facilities and activities are much more diverse than those of any particular private
party. Further, the nature of many public activities makes
supervision and control more difficult for public officials than
it is for the average businessman. Also, because access to most
public activities is free, additional costs cannot be imposed on a
specified group of users through increased prices for access to
the activity or facility. This last difficulty has resulted in political pressure by public officials to obtain immunity from suit.
As the distinction between negligence and strict liability for
defective performance has faded, public officials have been
held liable for full compensation on what is essentially a strict
liability standard.4 9
Because in most cases no particular group of consumers is
available to pay an additional fee, the cost of compensating
injured parties must be borne by the taxpayers. In turn, the
taxpayers, many of whom might not be using the particular
facility, may opt to close facilities and services rather than pay
for those that have limited appeal. Proposed solutions are
either to exempt public facilities from liability except in cases
of active, intentional fault or to adopt a limited system of compensation modeled on victim's compensation or worker's compensation statutes. The latter solution seems preferable
an exception since drivers as a class pay gasoline taxes as a surrogate for user fees.
Other government services based on user fees should be treated similarly.
49. See, e.g., Hendry v. Manser, No. A8402-0}697 (Multnomah County Cir. Ct.,
Ore., filed July 17, 1985; reported in 29 ATLA 21 (1986)); Hamblin v. County of Los
Angeles, No. C3282 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Cal., filed Oct. 1. 1985; reported in
29 ATLA 78 (1986)).
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because some redress would be available to individuals who are
injured through no fault of their own and the cost could be
determined like that of maintenance costs in public budgets.
C. Summary
The extension of full tort recovery to cases based on strict
liability rather than fault has made it impossible to develop
coverage that can properly be included in the price of the product due to the uncertainty of possible claims. If we recognize
that strict liability in tort is based on insurance principles and
should be administered on these principles, the tort crisis
would dissipate without destroying the fault system. The problem with the remedies proposed under the various tort reform
acts is that they fail to incorporate these insurance principles.
More importantly, some of the attempts at alleviating the tort
crisis, such as limiting recoverable damages, effectively deprive
tort victims of their constitutional rights without due process
of law.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WASHINGTON'S
TORT REFORM ACT

According to the preamble of the Washington Tort Reform
Act, the purpose of limiting recovery is to lower the cost of
insurance for the community as a whole.' The increased costs
are due in part to judicial extensions of liability. Yet the solutions proposed by the Act are not to curtail those extensions
but to limit the amount that can be recovered for non-economic injuries such as pain and suffering and permanent disability. Limitations apply no matter how grievous the fault. As
such, these limitations amount to a taking. For the state to
take property from one person and transfer it either to
another person or to the public in general is inappropriate.
According to Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull:
An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary
to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority .... A
few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law
A law that
punish[ing] a citizen for an innocent action ....
destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens;
a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010 (preamble)(1987).
supra note 16.

For full text of statute, see
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that takes propertyfrom A. and gives it to B. 5
More recently, the Supreme Court stated in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n:52

Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the condition and
the original purpose of the building restriction converts that
purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to
serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without pay53
ment of compensation.

An analogy to tort reform legislation is appropriate. If the
purpose of tort reform legislation is to transfer losses from the
tortfeasor to the victim by limiting recovery, the result is the
same as transferring an easement from a private person to the
state for the public benefit. As the Supreme Court indicated in
Nollan, although the legislature does have the authority to
redefine property rights for a public purpose so as to eliminate
a person's right to exclusive use of his property, the person
must be provided just compensation. 54 On the other hand, if
the restriction is merely procedural and serves to increase the
fairness and the efficiency of dispute resolution, then the
restriction is valid even if at times it would reduce recovery.
For example, the provision of Washington's Tort Reform Act
that eliminates joint liability of the tortfeasors when the plaintiff is partially at fault"5 serves to increase fairness because a
plaintiff and a defendant, both partially at fault, will be compelled to seek recovery from other defendants who caused the
accident. For the same reason, notice requirements, discovery
requirements, and other adjustments on the burden of production or the burden of persuasion are reasonable regulations of
dispute resolution and are not transfers of property from A to
B or from A to the public at large.
A legislature may not redefine a person's right to bodily
integrity so that the state or other persons may intentionally
or negligently touch or injure him or her. To the extent that a
51. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis added).
52. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
53. Id. at 3141. 3148.
54. Id. at 3150.
55. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070 (1987). See Peck, Constitutional Challenges to the
Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several
Liability Made by the 1986 Woshington Tort Reform Act, 62 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1987)
(Prof. Peck raises the issue of whether this provision grants procedural due process).
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particular limitation on liability redefines one's right to be free
from intentional or negligent injury, it should be unconstitutional as a violation of due process and of the just compensation clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and article
I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution.SS The duty
of the state under the fourteenth amendment is to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its inhabitants. This duty was
imposed on the states to ensure that all classes of legal property and all persons would be protected.5 7 The fourteenth
amendment incorporated John Locke's proposition that the
purpose of government is to protect life, liberty, and property,
and that the purpose of legislation is to improve the procedural
protection of life, liberty, and property and not eliminate or
Moreover, the fourteenth amendment
destroy them.ss
included the proposition that the state could not take property
for public use without just compensation.
The counter-argument to Locke's proposition is that property or rights do not exist in the abstract but must be defined
by law. Thus, the right of a person to be free from the intentional or negligent infliction of bodily harm could be redefined
merely by limiting the amount of recovery for harm sustained.
But if the state's power to redefine legal rights is not limited
by Locke's view that the purpose of legislation is to render
rights more secure, then since enactment of the Magna Carta,
the rights of Englishmen and Americans have been illusory.
Why limit the legislature's power to infringe on life, liberty,
and property if the legislature can infringe upon those rights
58. The origin of this provision is the Magna Carta, § 40: "To no one will we sell,
to no one will we deny or delay right or justice."
Act Abolishing Arbitrary Courts (1641), Act of the Lay Parliament V, 16 Char. I,
ch. 8.
D. HOWARD, THE ROAD To RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
38 (1968) [hereinafter HOWARD]. See also WASH. CONST. art. I-XI;
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "139; Davidson v. Louisiana, 96 U.S. 97 (1978)
(concurring opinion); and Nollan v. Coastal Comrnm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
57. The position of this article is that the due process clause imposes a positive
duty on the state to vindicate the rights of persons to their life, liberty and property by
providing state remedies for the deprivation of such rights by other persons.
58. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING
THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1978), where he states
the purpose of government is to secure one's life, liberty, and property. See also 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138, 139; Nollan, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *134, 135. See generally B. SHIPMAN, ON COMMON LAW PLEADING (3d
IN

AMERICA

ed. 1923).
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merely by redefining them? It would be logically absurd to
grant constitutional access to courts of general jurisdiction and
a jury determination of legal rights if at the same time the legislature could define those rights out of existence.5 9 A similar
conundrum is whether the Washington legislature's decision to
limit pain and suffering damages to $250,000.00 is a
recharacterization of one's right to be free from bodily harm,
or whether it is simply an adjustment of future legal rights.
Analogizing to the real property example, a similar restriction
on a landowner's right to enjoin a trespass or to bring an action
for damages for trespass would strip the landowner of his
property rights as effectively as requiring him to grant an easement to the public without just compensation. 6°
Functionally, therefore, a limitation on damages or on
injunctive relief may be as effective a way of restricting personal freedom as allowing a taking of property without due
process or just compensation. The duty of the legislature to
adopt and manage a civil justice system does not entitle the
legislature to use its management power to deprive parties of
remedies for invasion of their basic rights.6 1
If a protected interest can be redefined by law, physical
liberty could also be redefined to include, for example, a
requirement that police permission be obtained prior to leaving
one's house, neighborhood, city, or state. Such a substantive
law would be equivalent to house arrest and would therefore
59. This situation would be as illogical as allowing a legislature to redefine a fee
simple easement that provided unrestricted access to a public beach as was attempted
in Nollan. The issue is complicated when the extension of liability is judicially
imposed as it was in adopting strict liability, or by expanding liability by the
elimination of privity. The redefinition of property rights is quite different from
subjecting such rights to the police power. See, e.g., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
The City of Seattle v. Ford, 144 Wash. 107, 257 P. 243 (1927); Mahoney v. Sailors'
Union; 43 Wash. 2d 874, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953). The issue is not whether particular
common law rights defining life, liberty, or property can be subject to regulation but
whether such rights may be extinguished in favor of either other private persons or
the public.
60. See Nollan, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987). There the Supreme Court held that the
State of California could require payment or transfers of property by the owner to the
public only when the development in question directly related to the cost of providing
public services or when the development directly interfered with public benefits.
61. Thus, in Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court decided that the
injured party was entitled to a remedial action even though Congress had not
established a statutory remedy. Blackstone states that taking private property for
public purposes may be accomplished "[n]ot by absolutely stripping the subject of his
property in an arbitrary manner, but by giving him full indemnification and equivalent

for the injury thereby sustained." 2 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

"139.
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be subject to a habeas corpus petition. If such a statute were
adopted, it would certainly infringe upon one's constitutional
liberty. On a parity of reasoning, the state cannot use its
authority to deny access to the courts so as to limit the rights
of individuals to redress for injuries to their life, liberty, or
property.
Confusion arises because public rights created by statute
can be eliminated by statute. This principle has been upheld
on both the state and federal level. On the state level, for
example, in construing article I, section 3 of the Washington
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Washington has held that
a tort action can be brought only by virtue of a statute, that no
vested right accrues therein, and that the legislature can
revoke this right at any time.6 2 Moreover, even legal rights
and property rights are subject to the legitimate exercise of the
state's police power.63
On a national level, the distinction between public rights
created by statute and traditional private rights known at common law is apparent when one compares Atlas Roofing Co. v.
6
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm 'n and Northern Pipe Line v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.6 In the former case,
the Court upheld the statutory exclusion of the right to jury
trial against a constitutional challenge because the issue
involved public rights rather than liberty interests.' In the
latter case, a statute allowing article I judges to decide cases
involving private law was declared unconstitutional because
the statute attempted to change the kind of court that could
67 These
deal with private rights under the sixth amendment.
cases hold that the legislature may create, limit, or annul new
private causes of action in the exercise of its police power. But
the police power does not entitle the legislature to destroy private rights as defined by common law or to transfer property
from one person to another.68
62. Hansen v. West Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wash. 2d 825, 827, 289 P.2d 718,
'20 (1955) (quoting Robinson v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 2d 157, 164, 291 P.2d 330, 333
(1930)).
63. See Ketcham v. King County Medical Serv. Corp., 81 Wash. 2d 565, 502 P.2d
1197 (1972); County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).
64. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
65. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
66. Atlas, 430 U.S. at 460-61.
67. Northern, 458 U.S. at 87.
68. Courts should recognize the distinction between the defining of natural or
:ested rights through the writ system and the creation of liability rules for the better
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Thus, a legitimate exercise of the police power that limits
private rights or the imposition of additional liability through a
statutorily created cause of action must relate directly to a legislatively perceived evil or to a cost arising from the particular
activity.69
The victims of tort actions do not in any way impose costs
on the rest of society. Legislation that caps recovery for pain
and suffering requires that persons who have been wrongfully
injured give up the right to recover their losses from the
ordering of society. The modification of the former at a minimum requires
compensation if these rights are limited or eliminated, while the latter category can be
modified at will by the legislature. As this article has pointed out, there is no real
distinction between the right to fully enjoy Blackacre and the right to fully enjoy
health or physical security. The mere fact that the action for recovery for
infringement of one's property is trespass and the action for recovery for physical
injury is either trespass or trespass on the case should not be the basis for a different
treatment when the legislature attempts to limit one's recovery.
In The Road to Runnymede, Howard describes what has been protected
historically:
Thus the Body of Liberties deals with such things as due process of law,
general application of laws, the relationship of church and state, judicial
procedures, and (in separate sections) "liberties" of freemen, women, children,
servants, and foreigners. It resembled, to look backwards, the kinds of
principles stated in Magna Carta, and, to look forward, it foreshadowed the
bills of rights which were in the next century to become standard features of
the American federal and state constitutions. Its resemblance to Magna Carta
is striking. The Body of Liberties begins with the declaration that no man's
life, person, family, or property should be proceeded against or in "any way
indammaged under coulor of law or Countenance of Authoritie, unlesse it be
by vertue or equitie of some expresse law of the Country warranting the
same, established by a generall Court and sufficiently published, or in case of
the defect of a law in any parteculer case by the word of god.". . . And it
marks a link in one of the longest of jurisprudential chains, the concept of
"due process," or "law of the land," which stretches at least from Magna
Carta's chapter 39 to the mandate of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," and the like provisions of the state
constitutions....
Other provisions of the Body of Liberties state principles drawn from
Magna Carta. "No mans Cattel or goods," says the 1641 document, shall be
taken for public use "without such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie
rates of the Countrie do afford"; if the cattle or goods suffer damage, "the
owner shall be suffitiently recompenced." Compare chapter 28 of the Magna
Carta, which forbids the King's offiders to take "the corn or other chattels of
any man without immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily consents to
postponement of payment." Again, both provisions, that of 1215 and that of
1641, lie in a tradition culminating in provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, the requirement of just compensation for property taken for
public use.
HOWARD, supra note 56, at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
69. See supra note 60.
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tortfeasor so that the insurance group that the tortfeasor
belongs to will have lower rates. This transfer of assets
between the victim and the insurance group, which includes
the tortfeasor, violates the taking clause 0 just as much as the
ordinance in Nollan did when it required the granting of an
easement for the public benefit without compensation.
Whether the limitation is perceived as a constitutional denial
of access to courts under the Magna Carta or a violation of due
process under the fourteenth amendment, the limitation on
recovery is unconstitutional. The purpose of the limitation is
simply to make insurance coverage more accessible to the general run of businesses at the expense of the victims of wrongful acts.
In all cases of limiting a future right to contract or a
future right to develop one's property, the imposition of a
police regulation must be directly related to the possible harm
of the contemplated action. For example, a restriction on the
right to contract that requires disclosure of interest or finance
charges relates directly to the public's costs of borrowing. Similarly, a restriction on the right to do business in a particular
location must relate to the harm that would be imposed on the
surrounding neighborhood.
By contrast, a cap on damages for pain and suffering arbitrarily affects certain individuals who are not engaged in any
activity that would result in injuries to others. The need to
reduce tort payments and thereby reduce insurance costs may
be a legitimate aim of a public policy, but it is difficult to perceive why victims of intentional or negligent torts should be
compelled to subsidize these lower rates. The solution to this
problem lies in limiting damages where they have been inappropriately granted and prohibiting legislatures from arbitrarily appropriating victims' compensation to offset insurance
premiums.
As we have pointed out, legislatures have not been the
only agencies to create liability in order to carry out public
purposes. By adopting strict liability and by eliminating the
requirement of privity in product liability cases, the courts
have extended liability beyond the definition of property rights
developed through the writ system. Because these extensions
of liability were justified for public policy reasons rather than
to define legal or property rights, the amount and scope of
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V. & XIV. See generally Nollan, 107 S.Ct. 3141.
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resulting damages is fully subject to legislative modification or
repeal in the same manner as legislatively created rights.
Thus, such public policy causes of action are similar to statutorily created causes of action and are fully subject to legislative
modification.
Both public policy causes of action and statutory causes of
action are distinct from the customary rights of action developed by the writ system because the former are created to deal
with a public purpose while the latter were developed to define
liberty and property. These latter rights and other constitutional rights granted by state and federal constitutions comprise the property protected by the Magna Carta and the life,
liberty, and property described by John Locke." The government has a duty to protect these rights and they are subject
only to appropriate police power regulations that enhance their
general exercise. Under this approach, the Washington Tort
Reform Act's limitation of damages to $250,000.00 for pain and
suffering is clearly valid when applied to cases arising under
strict liability, but is invalid as an unconstitutional taking
when applied to cases arising from the intentional or negligent
acts of a tortfeasor.
III.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The question for courts faced with challenges to tort
reform is whether to strike down the legislation as a destruction of private rights or to uphold the legislative response as a
rational attempt to deal with an insurance crisis. As we have
shown, the problem is compounded by the failure of the legislature to distinguish strict liability from negligence within the
common law system of adjudication. Under our analysis, strict
liability should be subject to legislative checks both in substance and process. On the other hand, legislation limiting
non-economic damages in common law negligence and intentional tort actions or eliminating these actions through statutes
of repose deny a citizen's basic rights for the benefit of insurance companies and the business community.
The judicial response to this confusion has varied. Courts
that have struck down such legislation have assumed that legislatures may not destroy private rights and, therefore, must
provide reasonable access to courts and juries for legitimate
71. See supra note 58.
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damage clains. 2 Other courts have upheld the restrictions on
basic rights as long as the effect of the legislation was to fur7 3 Courts in the latter cases
ther a legitimate public purpose.
have assumed that individual private rights can be sacrificed
for the public good without finding that the state is guilty of an
unjustified taking or of depriving a complainant of access to
courts. As we have shown, courts that strike down such legislation are in some instances correct while courts upholding
such legislation are in other instances equally correct. No solution to this apparent inconsistency can exist until the legal
community first accepts the distinction between causes of
action created for policy reasons and causes of action created to
define private rights and then permits modification of the former and protects the integrity of the latter.

72. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long and Hagerty, Inc., 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Smith
v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
Washington's Tort Reform Act was recently struck down as unconstitutional by
Superior Court Judge Edward Heavy on the grounds that it denies equal protection

under the United States and Washington Constitutions and also violates the right to
jury trial. Carter v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87203555-7 (order entered Feb. 19, 1988).
The case was still pending in superior court at the time this article was published;

presumably, the decision will be appealed.
73. Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 200 Conn. 562, 512 A.2d 893 (1986); Williams v.
Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000 (La. App. 1983); Smith v. City of
Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986).
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APPENDIX

A.

Limiting recovery for noneconomic

losses.

See, e.g.,

09.17.010 (1987) (noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions limited to $500,000.00 except
in cases of substantial impairment or disfigurement);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (1987) (noneconomic
damages limited to $250,000.00 unless court finds justification by clear and convincing evidence in which case damages limited to $500,000.00); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80
(West Supp. 1988) (noneconomic damages limited to
$450,000.00), contra Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080,
1088-89 (Fla. 1987) (holding damage cap unconstitutional
as violating injured party's right of access to courts and
right to trial by jury); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (Supp.
1987) (damages for pain and suffering limited to
$375,000.00); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (Supp. 1987)
(noneconomic damages limited to $250,000.00); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2509 (Supp. 1987) (actions for damages due to negligent service of liquor limited to
$250,000.00); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108
(Supp.
1987)
(noneconomic
damages
limited
to
$350,000.00); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West
Supp. 1987) (damages in medical malpractice actions limited to $500,000.00 except in cases of substantial impairment or disfigurement); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1483 (West Supp. 1987) (noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions limited to $225,000.00 unless
noted exceptions exist); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23 (West
Supp. 1988) (intangible damages limited to $400,000.00
except for pain, disability or disfigurement); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions limited to $350,000.00);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1987) (noneconomic
damages limited to $875,000.00); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 21-3-11 (1987) (total damage in medical malpractice
actions limited to $1,000,000.00); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-147.1 (Supp. 1986) (noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions limited to $250,000.00); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.56.250 (1987) (noneconomic damages limited to an
amount of 0.43 multiplied by average annual wage and life
expectancy of injured party); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8
(Supp. 1987) (noneconomic damages in medical malpracALASKA STAT. §
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tice actions limited to $1,000,000.00); WIs.. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.55 (West Supp. 1987) (noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions limited to $1,000,000.00).
Statutes of repose that create an absolute time limit in
which to bring an action after exposure to a negligent act,
even when the injured party has had no notice of the
injury during that time period. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 337.15 (1982) (10 year statute of limitation on inju-

C.

D.

ries arising out of latent deficiencies in developing and
improving real property); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2B
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (3 year statute of limitation on
injuries arising out of deficiencies or neglect in designing,
planning, or constructing improvements to real property);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1987) (6 year statute of
limitation on injuries arising out of deficiencies in designing, planning, or constructing improvements to real property); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.205 (1983) (6 year statute of
limitation on injuries arising out of deficiencies in designing, planning, or constructing improvements to real
property).
Elimination of strict product liability for manufactured
products sold in interstate commerce. See, e.g., 11 B. TROLLEN, STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT CONTROLLING LIABILITY
INSURANCE CRISIS: STATE ACTIONS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM (No. 1 1986).
Two federal bills were introduced in 1985: S.B. 100, introduced by Senator Bob Kasten of Wisconsin, requires proof
of negligence on the part of the manufacturer and provides
for a two-year statute of limitation; amendment to S.B. 44,
introduced by Senators Christopher Dodd of Connecticut
and Slade Gorton of Washington, does not require proof of
negligence but allows for a speeded-up claims process. Id.
of joint and several liability among
Elimination
tortfeasors. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987)
(no defendant is liable for an amount greater than that
defendant's degree of fault); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81
(West Supp. 1988) (a party is liable based on degree of
fault and not on basis of joint and several liability); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-12 (Supp. 1987) (relative degree of fault

of joint tortfeasors is considered in determining liability);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1986) (no defendant is
liable for any amount in excess of that defendant's propor-
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tion of fault); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1987) (liability is
based on individual defendant's percentage of fault).
E. In actions against health professionals, a requirement that
claims be submitted to a medical panel for screening or
arbitration before filing in court. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (West Supp. 1987) (medical malpractice actions shall be referred to medical liability review
panel upon filing of action); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2
(Burns Supp. 1987) (no action against health care providers
may be commenced in court until presented to medical
review panel unless all defendants agree otherwise); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Supp. 1987) (either party may call
for review by medical malpractice panel and no court
action may be brought within panel's period of review);
VT. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 166i (Supp. 1985) (no action
against health care providers allowed until reviewed by a
medical malpractice committee); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.04
(West 1980) (repealed 1986).
F. Additional notice of intent-to-sue requirements relating to
public facilities. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5522
(Purdon Supp. 1987) (requiring notice of intent to sue
within six months of injury); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 156 (West 1988) (failure to provide notice of claim within
90 days after injury results in 10% reduction of claim).
G. Limiting the attorney fees that may be paid to the plaintiff's attorney. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568
(West 1982) (at request of any party in health care actions,
the court shall determine reasonableness of each party's
attorneys' fees); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West
Supp. 1988) (in medical malpractice actions, attorneys' fees
are limited to: (1) 40% of first $50,000.00; (2) 33 1/3% of
next $50,000.00; (3) 25% of next $500,000.00; (4) 15% of any
amount in which recovery exceeds $600,000.00); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (Supp. 1986) (in medical malpractice
actions, attorneys' fees may not exceed: (1) 35% of first
$100,000.00; (2) 25% of next $100,000.00; (3) 10% of balance
of any awarded damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West
1986) (in tort actions against the state, attorneys' fees limited to 25% of any judgment or settlement); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1 (Burns 1983) (attorneys' fees from medical malpractice patient's compensation fund limited to 15%
of any recovery from fund); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.138
(West Supp. 1987) (in medical malpractice actions the
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court shall determine reasonableness of any contingent fee
arrangements); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-1216 (Supp. 1987)
(attorneys' fees to be paid by any party in medical malpractice actions shall be approved by the judge); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2834 (1984) (on motion of any party in medical
malpractice actions the court shall review attorneys' fees
incurred by that party); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-A (McKinney Supp. 1988) (in medical malpractice actions, attorneys'
fees are limited to: (1) 30% of first $250,000.00; (2) 25% of
next $250,000.00; (3) 20% of next $500,000.00; (4) 15% of
next $250,000.00; (5) 10% of any amount over
$1,250,000.00); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (1980) (in
medical malpractice actions, reasonable attorneys' contingent fees shall be determined by the court, not to exceed
1/3 of all damages).
H. Elimination of the collateral source benefits rule. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1987) (after fact finder
has rendered award and the court has awarded costs and
attorney's fees, defendant may introduce evidence of collateral source benefits); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52225(a) (West Supp. 1988) (in personal injury actions, the
court shall receive evidence concerning collateral source
benefits and make appropriate adjustments in amount of
award before entering judgment); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 548.36 (West Supp. 1988) (in personal injury actions, the
court shall reduce damage award by any amounts paid by
statutorily defined collateral sources).

